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INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION:  
THE CONCEPT OF CONSULTATION
by Cheryl Saunders
INTRODUCTION 
I was asked to make some remarks about the concept of ‘consultation’ 
in the proposal for Indigenous constitutional recognition put 
forward by the Cape York Institute (‘CPI’). My understanding of what 
presently is proposed is taken from the two submissions by the CPI 
to the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (‘Joint Committee’)1 
and from Anne Twomey’s very helpful piece in The Conversation, 
translating these proposals into constitutional form.2
The essential elements, as I understand them, are these:
• An Indigenous body would be required by the Constitution, 
with its composition, roles, powers and procedures provided 
in legislation.
• The body would provide ‘advice’ to the Commonwealth 
Parliament and government on what are described as ‘matters 
relating’ to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
• The advice would be required to be tabled in the Parliament 
as soon as practicable, by the Prime Minister or the Speaker (in 
principle, I prefer the latter).
• Both Houses would be required to ‘give consideration’ to the 
advice in debating proposed laws with respect to Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
• The ‘advice’ would not be binding and the provisions would be 
drafted so as to be non-justiciable (although without expressly 
saying so).
• The Indigenous body could be proactive as well as reactive, in 
the sense of offering advice on any matters as it considered fit.
• This new provision would be added to the Constitution in a 
new Chapter IA, immediately following the chapter on the 
Parliament and preceding the chapter on the Executive.
OBSERVATIONS
In my view, this is a helpful and constructive proposal, offering a 
new and quite different approach to constitutional recognition, 
which has some potential to be both effective and broadly 
acceptable. It fits with the distinctive focus of the Australian 
Constitution on institutions and the organisation of power as 
the principal tools for ensuring compliance with principles of 
constitutionalism. It is vastly preferable to a watered down, purely 
symbolic version of the Expert Panel’s proposals3, if that proves 
to be the only alternative on offer.
I should make it clear, however, that I profoundly disagree with 
the description of the Constitution as a ‘procedural, practical 
and pragmatic Charter of Government’ that accompanies the 
justification for this proposal. That description denies the dignity 
and significance of the institutions that the Constitution establishes, 
drawing on the potentially rich conception of Australian federal 
democracy. And I also disassociate myself from the concerns about 
the effects of a non-discrimination clause in the Constitution, which 
are not only exaggerated, but pay insufficient regard to the well-
founded fears of Indigenous Australians about placing their faith 
in the Australian political process alone.
I agree with Anne Twomey that the proposal for an Indigenous 
constitutional body can be drafted so as to be non-justiciable, at 
least as far as the giving and taking of advice are concerned, on the 
basis that this occurs within the lawmaking process. In the absence 
of justiciability, however, the political process bears a heavy burden, 
which must be discharged effectively if this form of constitutional 
recognition is to be meaningful. 
To attempt to ensure that the political process is up to the task, 
the proposal relies on the transparency that would accompany 
the tabling of the Indigenous body’s advice in the Parliament, 
coupled with the respect that the views of the Indigenous 
body should attract, initially and over time. There are Australian 
precedents for strategies of this kind. In its early years, the former 
Administrative Review Council relied entirely on the persuasive 
quality of its tabled advice for its considerable influence over the 
direction of development of the administrative law system. In a 
sense, the legislative bills of rights in Victoria and the Australian 
Capital Territory also rely on transparency to ensure that the 
protected rights are taken into account when new legislation 
is made.
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Nevertheless, if this proposal is to go forward it should be carefully 
designed in full understanding of the reality that the Australian 
political culture is indeed very bad at genuine consultation; either 
with the public at large or with groups affected by particular 
proposals. The history of dealings with Indigenous peoples is 
testament to this reality, which may be attributable to a shortfall 
in understanding of what effective consultation involves, in skills, 
or in commitment. The recent fate of self-government in Norfolk 
Island is a recent illustration in a different context. 
Several other aspects of the proposal also deserve further 
consideration from the standpoint of its reliance on consultation 
or advice.
First, in its present form, the proposal does not adequately take 
account of the range of actors making decisions that affect 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, at various points in 
the policy development cycle. 
All levels of government exercise public power in ways that 
affect Indigenous peoples: the Commonwealth, the states, the 
territories and local government. Indigenous peoples are affected 
by policies given effect through executive, as well as legislative 
action. Executive schemes reliant on spending, or contract, or 
intergovernmental agreement are endemic in the Australian 
system of government. The proposal to close down Indigenous 
communities in the north of Western Australia, for example, 
involved funding decisions taken by both levels of government. 
Within the executive branch, decisions are taken by a wide range 
of actors, including Ministers, both individually and in Cabinet, 
and bureaucrats. And even if consultation with the Indigenous 
body is confined to legislation, governments are committed to 
the form and purpose of legislation well before proposals hit the 
parliamentary floor.
Secondly, it is not entirely clear to me when the consultative 
mechanisms will be triggered, on the proposal as it presently 
stands. I accept that the proposal is drafted so as to confer a 
broader authority on the Indigenous body to give advice than on 
the Commonwealth Parliament to take the advice into account. I 
assume that the former would entitle the body to give advice on 
any initiative affecting Indigenous Australians in any way, as long 
as, at least, the body obtained information about the initiative early 
enough for its advice to have a chance of being effective. 
In relation to the obligation on the Commonwealth Parliament, 
there are several possible interpretations. One is that the obligation 
is triggered only when legislation relies (solely?) on whatever head 
of power to legislate for Indigenous peoples replaces the ‘race’ 
power in section 51(xxvi).  This would not, however, catch the 
legislation authorising the intervention in the Northern Territory. 
A second interpretation, which would do so, would require the 
Commonwealth Parliament to consider any relevant advice in 
making any law specifically for Indigenous peoples, whatever 
the source of power for the legislation. A third (but on the face 
of the text less likely) interpretation, would trigger the obligation 
to consider whenever legislation affected Indigenous people in 
company with others albeit, perhaps, in a particular way. 
A third point, to some extent consequential on the earlier two, 
is the proposed placement of the new provision in Chapter IA 
of the Constitution. I acknowledge that this placement gives the 
provision a prominence that fits with its significance. To the extent 
that the consultative mechanism is associated solely with proposed 
legislation passing through the Commonwealth Parliament, there 
also is some logic in placing the new provision immediately 
after the chapter on the Parliament. Interspersing a new chapter 
amongst the first three chapters of the Constitution on which the 
separation of powers depends is inelegant, however, from the 
standpoint of constitutional design. More significantly for present 
purposes, to the extent that the consultative mechanism ultimately 
has wider effect—at all levels of government and on all public 
decision-makers—this placement also may be misleading.  Most 
significantly of all, it may also be impolitic; encouraging (spurious) 
claims that the Indigenous body gives an unfair advantage to 
Indigenous peoples in the legislative process or that, in some 
unexplained way, it amounts to a third chamber of the legislature.
An alternative placement might be in a new Chapter VIIA, in a 
new section 127, replacing the discriminatory provision that 
was removed in 1967 (and thus having a symbolism of its own). 
The chapter heading might specifically refer to recognition. The 
new section 127 might include the new power to legislate for 
Indigenous peoples, in lieu of section 51(xxvi), followed by the 
requirement for the establishment of the Indigenous advisory body 
and an obligation on the Parliament to consider its advice, when 
it proposed to exercise the new power.4 This arrangement would 
make it clear that the power and the obligation to consult were 
linked; an impeccable arrangement, on any view. The Indigenous 
body should still have the authority to advise on any aspect of 
Many parts of the world already 
have in place much more formalised 
procedures for consultation with 
Indigenous peoples and other 
structural minority groups.
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Australian governance affecting Indigenous people, and its advice 
should still be required to be tabled in the Parliament, but the 
package might more readily be perceived as directed solely to the 
imperatives of recognition.
COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE
Some insights into ways in which an approach to recognition 
that constitutionalised a mechanism for consultation might be 
both justified and strengthened can be drawn from comparative 
experience.
Many parts of the world already have in place much more 
formalised procedures for consultation with Indigenous peoples 
and other structural minority groups, not only in order to give 
effect to international obligations but, even more importantly, 
as an obvious way of providing good governance. These include:
• Scandinavia, where consultation occurs with Sami Parliaments 
in Finland, Norway and Sweden.5
• Europe, pursuant to the Framework Convention on National 
Minorities.6
• New Zealand, where there is a developed understanding of 
what consultation with Maori involves, for decision-making 
both within and outside the Treaty of Waitangi.7
• Canada, where an obligation to consult has been associated 
with the ‘honour of the Crown’, given apparent impetus by the 
1982 constitutional changes (section 35).8
Ideas and techniques that can be extracted from this experience 
with potential relevance for present purposes include the following:
• Consultation can be equated with (effective) participation 
and active involvement in public decision-making. It should 
be measured both by the opportunity to make substantive 
(and timely) contributions; and in terms of the effect of the 
contributions on the final decisions made.
• The rationale for consultation, thus understood, lies in 
good governance, understood from the perspective of 
both government and governed. Public policy based on 
consultation is likely to be both adequately informed and 
accepted by those to whom they apply.
• Consultation should be undertaken ‘in good faith, with the 
objective of reaching agreement.’
• The obligation to consult, understood in this way, extends 
to all public agencies, at all levels of government, exercising 
public authority through all available instruments, ranging 
from legislation, regulations and funding decisions through 
to soft law.
• The obligation to consult applies when Indigenous interests 
are affected ‘directly’, but not in relation to ‘matters of a general 
nature … assumed to affect the society as a whole’, to quote 
the understanding in relation to the Sami Parliament.
• Public authorities are obliged to inform an Indigenous body 
about all matters in this category, as early as possible in the 
decision-making process.
• Information about both agreement and lack of agreement 
should be included in Cabinet documents and in parliamentary 
proceedings.
• Regular meetings should be held between government leaders 
and the Indigenous body (or representatives of it).
INSIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA
The lessons of these insights for the Australian proposal are obvious. 
At the risk of repetition, however, they include the following:
• A principal rationale (perhaps the rationale) for achieving 
constitutional recognition in this way lies in the contribution 
that it makes to good government.
• ‘Consultation’ (or giving and receiving advice) involves a rich 
and genuine process that is concerned with outcome as well 
as input; that is pursued in good faith; and that is undertaken 
with the goal of reaching agreement (even if the goal is not 
always realised).
• Consultation should take place whenever Indigenous interests 
are affected in a way that is distinctive and not shared by society 
as a whole, or other groups of it.
• Consultation should be undertaken by any public actor making 
decisions that affect Indigenous peoples in this way, at any 
level of government.
• For consultation to be effective, information should be 
provided to the Indigenous body at the start of a policy process.
• If agreement is not reached, and a decision is to be made 
without or against the advice of the Indigenous body, this 
should be publically disclosed. 
• Regular meetings should occur between government or 
parliamentary leaders and representatives of the Indigenous 
body.
• In the Australian context, it might be useful to establish 
a committee of the Senate or of both Houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, to report on the advice and its 
implications for public policy, including legislation.
These insights suggest the way in which the arrangements should 
operate in practice. They do not necessarily, however, dictate the 
scope of the formal obligations to be placed on the Parliament by 
the constitutional provisions. 
For reasons suggested earlier, it might be politic for these to be 
expressed more narrowly, to formally oblige the Houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to take account of the Indigenous 
body’s advice only when a law is made pursuant to the head of 
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power that authorises lawmaking, with respect to Indigenous 
peoples; or, perhaps, when a law can be characterised as one with 
respect to Indigenous peoples, even if it could be supported by 
another law as well. If this were done, the de facto influence of 
the body might nevertheless grow over time, through the wider 
range of matters on which it chooses to give advice, the quality of 
its advice and the respect that the body attracts.
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